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RECENT DECISIONS
COMMUNITY PROPERTY: INDUSTRIAL
ACCIDENT COMMISSION AWARD:
IN RE SIMONI'S ESTATE (CAL. 1963)
Joseph and Leola Simoni were husband and wife; Ercole
Simoni was their adopted son. During their marriage Joseph was
injured in an industrial accident and subsequently received an
Industrial Accident Commission award of $3,372.62. This amount
was deposited in his name in a Santa Barbara bank. Joseph died
intestate one month after this deposit, and his wife was appointed
administratrix of his estate.
She filed a petition for distribution of all her husband's assets
to her. The son filed a petition alleging that the award by the Industrial Accident Commission was his father's separate property,
and that he, therefore, was entitled to share in that portion of
deceased's estate.
If the award was the separate property of the husband, the
son would be entitled to one-half of it.' However, if it was community property, the surviving spouse would be entitled to it all.'
The issue to be determined by the district court of appeal 3 was
whether the amount awarded by the Industrial Accident Commission was community property or the separate property of Joseph
Simoni. To arrive at its decision the court looked to the legislative
intent behind the enactment of section 163.5 of the California
Civil Code.4
PRE-163.5 LAW
Prior to 1957, when section 163.5 was added to the Civil
Code, damages recovered for personal injuries to either spouse
were community property-at least in the absence of an agreement
otherwise between the spouses.' The cases prior to 1957 proceeded
1 CAL. PROB. CODE

§§ 220, 221.

2 CAL. PROB. CODE § 201.

8 In re Simoni's Estate, 220 A.C.A. 343, 33 Cal. Rptr. 845 (1963).

4 All damages, special and general, awarded a married person in a civil action

for personal injuries, are the separate property of such married person.
5 Zaragosa v. Craven, 33 Cal. 2d 315, 320-21, 202 P.2d 73, 76-77 (1949);
McFadden v. Santa Ana Ry., 87 Cal. 464, 25 Pac. 681 (1891); Burton v. Villoria,
138 Cal. App. 2d 642, 292 P.2d 638 (1956).
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on the theory that both the cause of action and any recovery of
damages were community property.' Prior to 1957 the contributory
negligence of one spouse was imputed to the other to prevent recovery by either the innocent or the negligent spouse." But in 1957
the Legislature made all damages awarded to a married person
in a civil action his or her separate property.'
The precise question which confronted the court in the Simoni
case was whether the award by the Industrial Accident Commission
was an award of damages in a civil action as contemplated by the
Legislature in enacting section 163.5 of the Civil Code.
RATIONALE

The court thought that an important consideration in determining the intention of the Legislature in enacting section 163.5 was
the state of the old law-Was there any criticism of the law?
If so, was it well-founded? One court in Cole v. Rush stated:
"It is a generally accepted principle that in adopting legislation
the Legislature is presumed to have had knowledge of existing
domestic judicial decisions and to have enacted and amended statutes in the light of such decisions as have a direct bearing upon
them."9
Prior to 1957 the courts had imputed the contributory negligence of one spouse to the other spouse in order to prevent the
negligent spouse from profiting from his or her wrong. This was so
because each spouse had a community property interest in a recovery by the other.'" This principle of imputing contributory
negligence to the innocent spouse has been subject to much criticism." In Self v. Self the court said: "The hardships created by
allowing the contributory negligence of one spouse to be a defense
against the other caused criticism [citation], and the injustice of
that rule was undoubtedly the basic reason for the legislative
change in 1957. " 12 Senator Cobey, who drafted the new section
163.5, stated in a letter to Mr. Kleps, the Legislative Counsel, that
6 Sanderson v. Niemann, 17 Cal. 2d 563, 569-70, 110 P.2d 1025, 1028 (1941);
Johnson v. Hendrick, 45 Cal. App. 317, 187 Pac. 782, 785 (1919); 3 CAL. JUn.
Community Property §§ 50-53 (10 yr. Supp. 1936).
7 Kesler v. Pabst, 43 Cal. 2d 254, 256, 273 P.2d 257, 259 (1954); Burton v.
Villoria, 138 Cal. App. 2d 642, 644, 292 P.2d 638, 640 (1956).
8 CAL. CIv. CODE § 163.5.
9 Cole v. Rush, 45 Cal. 2d 345, 355, 289 P.2d 450, 456 (1955).
10 Kesler v. Pabst, 43 Cal. 2d 254, 273 P.2d 257 (1954); McFadden v. Santa
Ana Ry., 87 Cal. 464, 25 Pac. 681 (1891); Burton v. Villoria, 138 Cal. App. 2d 642,
292 P.2d 638 (1956).
11 4 WrrKn,
SUMMARY OF CALIFORNMA LAW 2711 (7th ed. 1960).
12 Self v. Self, 58 Cal. 2d 683, 691, 376 P.2d 65, 70, 26 Cal. Rptr. 97, 102 (1962).
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his intention was to outlaw the imputation of the contributory
negligence of one spouse to the other.'"
After a review of many critical decisions, the court in Simoni
reasoned that the Legislature had knowledge of such decisions and
the problems raised by them. Thus it concluded that by enacting
section 163.5 of the Civil Code the Legislature intended to eliminate
the defense of imputed negligence. 4
The court also reasoned that since neither contributory negligence nor negligence can be an issue in Industrial Accident Commission proceedings, there would be no object in enacting legislation
purporting to eliminate such an issue in those proceedings. Thus
section 163.5 of the Civil Code is not applicable to an award by
the Industrial Accident Commission. 5
CONCLUSION

The award by the Industrial Accident Commission was not
an award of damages in a civil action within the meaning of section 163.5 of the Civil Code. The award, therefore, was community
property, and the decedent's wife was entitled to the entire estate
including the Industrial Accident Commission's award.
Many problems have been raised by the enactment of section
163.5. The language of the statute, encompassing "all damages,
special or general . . ." would appear to include any recovery
awarded to a spouse, whether for pain or suffering, loss of earnings,
or medical expenses. Treating the latter two as separate property
may give rise to unjust results. For example, a serious accident
may convert the husband's future earnings into damages for lost
earning capacity. "If the husband collects a large judgment, his
wife will have none of her community property rights in money
that was a substitute for the husband's chief community asset,
his earning capacity."' 6 The same rationale would apply to medical
expenses; although medical expenses are a community obligation
for which community funds are liable, recovery for such medical
7
expenses is the separate property of the injured husband or wife.'
In the principal case such harsh results were avoided by treating the award as community property. The wife received her share
of her husband's earnings, and the community was reimbursed for
medical expenses spent for the injured husband.
18 9 HASTINGS L.J. 291, 295 (1958).
14 In re Simoni's Estate, 220 A.C.A. 343, 347, 33 Cal. Rptr. 845, 848 (1963).

15 Ibid.
16 32 STATE BAR J. 508 (1957).
17 4 WrrxIN, SumARY oF CALiwOmA LAW 2713 (7th ed. 1960).
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Although the court in the principal case has departed from the
spirit of section 163.5, its decision appears to be at least a partial
solution to some of the problems raised by enactment of the
section."8
Gary Giannini

WRONGFUL DEATH: RIGHTS OF MINORS:
CROSS v. PACIFIC GAS AND
ELECTRIC CO. (CAL. 1964)1

Plaintiffs, three minor children, brought an action by and
through their guardian ad litem for wrongful death for the death
of their father, alleging that the defendant was negligent in the
maintenance and operation of an electrical line. Suit was commenced nearly six years after the death of the father. The wife of
the deceased, an adult heir capable of suing, did not bring an action
for wrongful death within the one year statute of limitations.2 Defendant demurred to the complaint, and dismissal was granted
upon the sustaining of the demurrer on the ground that the statute
of limitations, having run against the adult heir (mother), also ran
against the minor heirs, since the cause of action for wrongful
death was a joint and single cause of action.'
Upon hearing by the Supreme Court of California, the court
in a unanimous decision reversed the judgment on demurrer. The
court held that each heir should be regarded as having a personal
and separate cause of action. The court reasoned that section 377
of the Code of Civil Procedure (wrongful death) was only procedural. It required the joinder of all heirs, but did not create a
joint cause of action. Defendant's argument that section 1431 of
the Civil Code applied,4 and thus the right should be presumed
to be joint, was rejected. The presumption that a right created in
18 4 WITKIN, SUM'MARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW 2712-13 (7th ed. 1960); 32
BAR. J. 508 (1957); 45 CALF. L. REv. 779 (1957).

STATE

1 Cross v. Pacific Gas and Electric Co., 60 A.C. 676, 36 Cal. Rptr. 321 (1964).
2 CAL. CODE CIv. PROC.

§

340(3).

8 Haro v. Southern Pacific R.R. Co., 17 Cal. App. 2d 594, 62 P.2d 441 (1936);
Sears v. Majors, 104 Cal. App. 60, 285 Pac. 321 (1930).
4 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431. It reads as follows: "An obligation imposed upon
several persons, or a right created in favor of several persons, is presumed to be
joint, and not several, except in the special cases mentioned in the title on the
interpretation of contracts. This presumption, in the case of a right, can be
overcome only by express words to the contrary."
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favor of several persons is joint can be overcome by express words
to the contrary. 5 The court reasoned that the last sentence of
section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure supplied the necessary
words to the contrary. It reads: "The respective rights of the
heirs in any award shall be determined by the court." These words
clearly showed that the right was several and not joint, and thus
that the interests of the heirs in an action for wrongful death are
separate and not joint.
Having determined that the cause of action of each heir was
separate, the court referred to section 352 of the Code of Civil
Procedure which suspends the statute of limitations during the
minority of the heirs. It decided that the minor heirs had a right
of action for the death of their father regardless of the inaction
on the part of the adult heir and the running of the statute of
limitations as to her. In support of this reasoning, the court referred to Estate of Riccomi6 which held that although the statute
provides for a lump sum recovery, the amount is determined by
the aggregate loss of all the heirs, and no recovery is allowed for
an heir not sustaining a loss. The court also cited Bowler v. Roos 7
which decided that the contributory negligence on the part of one
of the heirs does not bar recovery for wrongful death by those
heirs not guilty of contributory negligence.
The court, although deciding that each heir has a separate
cause of action for wrongful death, approved statements in other
cases to the effect that the wrongful death action is a joint one, or
joint, single and indivisible. By joint, it meant that all the heirs
should join or be joined in the action and a lump sum judgment
be given; that only one action for wrongful death may be brought,
whether or not it is instituted by one or all of the heirs or by the
personal representative. The action is indivisible in the sense
that there cannot be a series of suits by heirs against the tortfeasor for their individual damages.8
The Cross decision completely reversed the holdings of Haro
v. Southern Pacific R.R. Co.9 and Sears v. Majors, ° on which the
demurrer had been based and which held that the running of the
statute of limitations as to an adult heir precluded the minor heir
from suing for wrongful death on the basis that the cause of action
was strictly joint. The Cross case, in holding the causes of action
5 Ibid.
6 185 Cal. 458, 197 Pac. 97 (1921).
7 213 Cal. 484, 2 P.2d 817 (1931).
8 Cross v. Pacific Gas and Electric Co., 60 A.C. 676, 36 Cal. Rptr. 321 (1964).
9 17 Cal. App. 2d 594, 62 P.2d 441 (1936).
10 104 Cal. App. 60, 285 Pac. 421 (1930).
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to be several, sets out a more equitable and logical rule, since it
protects the minor's cause of action regardless of the inaction of
the adult heir who "sleeps on his rights."
The Cross decision removes one harsh application of the
statute of limitations in regards to minor children, but the reasoning is contradictory to that of the rule allowing in a proper case
the addition of new parties after the limitation period of one year
has run." Under the old rationale since the action was considered
joint for the purpose of the statute of limitations, the statute ran
only against the heirs as a class, and thus new parties could be
added if one heir brought suit prior to the running of limitation
period. The reasoning of the Cross case is inconsistent with such
a rule. Since each heir is now considered to have a separate cause
of action, the statute of limitations would seem to run against
individual heirs rather than against the heirs as a class.
The decision protects the rights of the minor heirs in the
immediate case and those of similar minors who did not sue while
the now overruled law of Sears and Haro was in effect. The general
rule is that a decision of a court of supreme jurisdiction overruling
a former decision is retrospective in its operation and the effect is
not that the former decision was bad law, but that it never was
the law.' 2 By operating retrospectively, the Cross ruling will allow
minor heirs who did not sue because they would have been barred
under the previous rule of the running of the statute of limitations
on an adult heir, to sue now, if they have not attained their majority. But as to minor heirs who sued and were demurred to on
the basis of Haro and Sears, the decision offers no relief. Although
the statute of limitations is considered procedural" in California,
a demurrer based on the statute of limitations is considered to
be a meritorious defense and would constitute a bar to another
suit on the same cause of action.' 4
The Cross case clearly holds that the interest of minors in
an action for wrongful death are separate; but what the effect of
this reasoning will be when interjected into situations which have
previously always been considered joint will have to await subsequent decisions.
Martin Capriola
11 Rabe v. Western Union Tel. Co., 198 Cal. 290, 244 Pac. 1077 (1926).
12 County of Los Angeles v. Faus, 48 Cal. 2d 672, 680-81, 312 P.2d 680,
685 (1957).
13 Wohlgemuth v. Meyer, 139 Cal. App. 2d 326, 293 P.2d 816 (1930).
14 RESTATEMENTS, JUDGMENTS § 50 (1942).

